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Canada, 10 years after9/11
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THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
Baskara T. Wardaya
Learningfrom US policy toward Indonesia under Sukarno
During the first two decades of the Cold War, especially during the
administration of the United States presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-
1961) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969), relations between the US and
Indonesia were marked with suspicion, ambiguity, and antagonism. This
was in part due to the failures ofmany US policymakers in understanding-
let alone respecting-Indonesia's culture and politics, especially as they
manifested in the political views and personality of Indonesia's first
president, Sukarno. Failing to see Sukarno as a Javanese- Indonesian leader
whose views on domestic and international politics stemmed from his
Javanese background, many Cold War US policymakers considered him a
communist demagogue who threatened US interests and world peace.
The failure brought far-reaching consequences.
President John F. Kennedy and his administration (1961-1963) to be .L.L.L ....~.L.L .....·.LT
toward Sukarno, greater pressures against the Indonesian president in the
US policymaking formulation remained dominant. One of the results of
such pressures was US support during President [ohnson's administration
Baskara T. Wardaya teacheshistory at Sonata Dharma urJj'Vf:;r.::>Jl-Y. Yoovasarta. Inaonesia,
and isa Fulbright scholar in residence at the Untversnv
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for Indonesia's massive anti-communist purge in 1965, which was followed
by the removal of President Sukarno from power. The US Cold War
policymakers succeeded in their anti-Sukarno course of action, but their
"success" was achieved at the expense of the lives of untold numbers of
Indonesians.
There are important lessons to draw from this tragic implementation
of diplomatic policy, especially with regard to today's post-Cold War
international politics, in which foreign policy makers are often challenged
to deal with global issues that require diplomatic and military involvement.
THE COLD WAR, THE US, AND SUKARNO
By most of the US media and policymakers, particularly since the second
half of the 195os, Sukarno was perceived and depicted as a pro-communist,
pro-Soviet Union demagogue who "deserved" to be pressured in order to
comply with US interests. These policymakers acknowledged Sukarno's
popularity among his people, but they also believed that the Indonesian
president was pushing his country to side with the Eastern bloc, the main
foe of the US. The US policymakers recognized Sukarno's prominence
among the newly-independent nations, but they were also convinced that
the Indonesian leader, if left alone, could ignite worldwide anti-American
sentiment among those nations.
Thus many US policymakers began to seek ways to pressure or even
unseat the Indonesian president. Following debates and argumentation
among themselves, these policymakers decided to help anti-Sukarno forces
in Indonesia in removing him from power.
JAVANESE CULTURE AND THE IDEA OF POLITICAL POWER
In the introduction ofhis book, The Religion ofJava, Clifford Geertz reminds
his readers that it is not easy to characterize Javanese culture with a single
label or dominant theme: Javanese culture (one of the most influential
cultures in Indonesia) is complex. I Java, the most populated island and home
of the country's largest ethnic group, has been influenced by many other
cultures over the centuries, including cultures that came from India, China,
the Middle East, Portugal, the Netherlands, and neighbouring nations.
The influences of foreign cultures made Javanese culture rich and
adaptable, able to absorb, incorporate, learn, and develop elements from
others. At the same time, these influences contributed to the Javanese
1 Clifford Geertz, The Religion ofJava (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), 7-
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tendency to combine elements ofone's own culture and tradition with
of other cultures. Not culture is often r1a':"r...."1I ....£~rl
having a strong tradition of syncretism.
Javanese people are typically of their culture's "- '-, "'«.'-'-' ,
many Javanese believe that Javanese culture is not "better" than other
cultures in the Indonesian archipelago, but also the culture against which
other cultures of the world should be measured. Based on such rr.."1"lT"1,.-,o"""ro
the Javanese believe that Javanese kings should not only use their power to
govern fellow Javanese people, but also to influence the world at
Traditionally, the Javanese have their own way power,
especially political power. To them, power is something that exists in
independent of human beings, but at the same time is realized in the
person who has the right to hold it, namely the legitimate ruler.' The
therefore, gains power not merely from the people but from his or her right
and legitimacy to hold power. Instead of coming from the people, the right
and legitimacy come from the ruler's ancestral line of power. He or she can
hold it as long as he or she has the ability and legitimacy to have it in his or
her hand. There are no administrative time limits on Javanese rule)
Moreover, for the Javanese ruler-and the Javanese people in general-
the idea of unity is highly important. The power of the ruler as a unifying
force is absolute. Opposition is not allowed, or is only given little space,
because it is considered a threat to unity. Dispersion or sharing of power
is not highly regarded. The concept of oneness (often translated into eka or
tunggal) is central in the Javanese concept of power. Any political move or
tendency-whether it comes from within or without-that could threaten
the unity of the kingdom is not tolerated and should be crushed.' Domestic
2 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Language and 'Power: Exploring Political Cultures in
Indonesia (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1990),38.
3 The Javanese concept of power is basically male-centered, but there were l::l\l~~npc::p
kingdoms that were ruled by queens, such as the Kalingga kingdom's Shima
(d. 732 CE) and Majapahit's Queen Tribhuwana Wijayatunggadewi (1328-1351CE).
4 Anderson, Language and Power, 36-37. As Anderson noted, "The urge to oneness,
so central to Javanese political attitudes, helps to explain the deep psychological
power of the idea of nationalism in Java. Far more than a political credo, it expresses a
fundamental drive to solidarity and unity in the face of the disintegration of traditional
society under colonial capitalism, and other powerful external forces .... Nationalism
of this type is something far stronger than patriotism; it is an attempt to reconquer a
primordial oneness."
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opposition and foreign intervention are considered dangerous and therefore
should not be accepted.
The Javanese also believe that there is certain logic in the pattern of
foreign relations. This pattern is reflected in the concept of mandala,
which the Javanese derived from an Indian political theory) The belief in
mandala-a circle that symbolizes the dynamics of influence, interests, or
ambition-reflects the Javanese idea of the struggle for expansion in the
pursuit of world-domination and universal peace under a sole and supreme
ruler.6
SUKARNO AND JAVANESE CULTURE
Sukarno was deeply influenced by Javanese culture, especially by the Javanese
concept of political power. Although his father was a Muslim Javanese and
his mother a Hindu Balinese, he grew up in Java and was mostly raised as a
Javanese. This is an important factor in explaining why he thought and acted
as he did throughout his political career. Javanese culture influenced his
philosophical and political views and approaches-how he viewed political
power in general, practiced domestic politics, and conducted international
relations.
Like Javanese culture, Sukarnds influences were diverse. His ideas and
actions were clearly inspired by traditional Javanese ideas, but at the same
time he borrowed from other cultures and traditions. He often used Javanese
concepts, but to them he added ideas from different religious traditions,
European philosophy, communism, and modern concepts of power. His
origins were humble, but he liked to build grandiose buildings and edifices.
He thought and acted as modern leader of a democratic republic, but
following the custom of traditional Javanese kings, he officially had several
wives.
In many of his writings and speeches Sukarno liked to blend elements
from different theories and religious traditions such as Marxism, Hinduism,
Christianity, and Islam." He also sought to reconcile different revolutionary
theories with the realities of colonial Indonesia. The result was a typically
Javanese synthesis of various beliefs and thoughts. Thus in 1926 Sukarno
began to promote the idea of NASAKOM. The term is an acronym for
5 lbid., 43-
6 Soemarsaid Moertono cited in Anderson, Language and Power, 43-44.
7 Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca &
London: Cornell University Press, 1969), 39.
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the Indonesian words NASionalisme (nationalism), Agama (religion), and
KOMunisme (communism). Inhis writings Sukarno
Islam, and Marxism together provided the basis for Indonesia's struggle for
independence.
As he grew up in the town of Blitar, East Java, Sukarno became """"lYYl,I,""l""
with Javanese culture and Javanese views of power. As a young boy he
very often watched wayang, puppet show performance and narration of
the Indian Ramayana and Mahabharata epics, which had shaped Javanese
values. From the epics he developed his understanding Javanese concepts,
including concepts of power, politics, and government.
As a leader with a Javanese cultural background Sukarno later claimed
to have the ancestral links that gave him the right and legitimacy to lead
Indonesia. This perhaps helps explain why on one hand, he embraced a style
of a modern national leader-that of a president of a democratic republic-
but on the other hand, he often acted like a Javanese traditional ruler, not
allowing any rival to his presidency and agreeing to be named president-for-
life.
Sukarno did not follow Javanese concepts and tradition blindly.
As Benedict Anderson puts it, Sukarno knew that "the mode of social
transformation must be adapted to traditional ideas," in this case to Javanese
ideas. He was also aware that "such a strategy presupposes a leadership
sophisticated enough to be deeply familiar with these ideas, yet not bound by
them, and disciplined enough to use them without succumbing to them.:"
He familiarized himself with Javanese ideas in order to use these ideas
as long as they confirmed to his notions of how to best govern Indonesia
according to modern system of government.
As a teenager Sukarno learned ofanti-colonial activists' ideas that would
continue to influence him: self.respect as a free Indonesian, the spirit of
nationalism and anti-imperialism, and socialist ideas. When he continued
his study in the city of Bandung, West Java, he met like-minded young
intellectuals and formed a study club, and against the will of the Dutch
colonial government, even established a political party, called PNI (Partai
Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Party).
During this time Sukarno came to the syncretic idea of combining
Marxism and Indonesia's colonial reality. Sukarno observed that while
according to Marxist theory, the worker in the capitalist society is poor
8 Anderson, Language and Power, 73.
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because he lacks control over the means ofproduction, in colonial Indonesia
the farmer owns some means ofproduction but remains poor.?
As per Javanese values, Sukarno regarded unity and balance as integral
to Indonesian politics. He harshly suppressed regional rebellions. When in
1956-1958 a number of regional military commanders rebelled against his
government, Sukarno took strong actions to suppress them, knowing that
the rebels were supported by the United States. In the early 1960s, when
the British and Malayan governments declared their intention to form the
Federation of Malaysia-and thus, according to Sukarno, threaten the unity
and security of Indonesia-the Indonesian president fiercely fought against
the idea. Sukarno had the Javanese cultural emphasis on unity on his side.
Also in line with Javanese culture was Sukarno's belief that foreign
relations were necessary to Indonesia's survival-and to his own political
survival. He believed that his power as Javanese king was not limited to
Indonesia. Although legally he was leader of Indonesia only, he wanted to
extend his influence outside the Indonesian borders. He was convinced that
international relations were not merely a matter of having good diplomatic
relations with other countries, but also ofcollaboration among equal parties
working to address global issues.
Sukarno emphasized the notion of equal relations among countries in
order to improve his standing among leaders of the world's great powers.
Moreover, he wanted to demonstrate that Indonesia was not only able to
govern itself, but was also able to lead other newly-independent nations in
common international progress. Sukarno was eager to show that although
Indonesia gained freedom from colonialism almost 170 years after the US
declared its independence, it had the right to be considered the equal of any
other country in the world. Hence he believed he had the right, as leader
of Indonesia, to be treated as an equal by other national leaders, including
American presidents.
As the Cold War divided the western capitalist bloc led by the United
States and the eastern communist bloc led by the Soviet Union, Sukarno
sought to find an alternative to hostility and antagonism, rather than
take a side. Sukarno supported the idea of building a coalition of neutral
countries that refused to side with either of the blocs..Hence he hosted the
1955 Bandung Conference of newly-independent countries and supported
the idea of forming the Non-aligned Movement. In Sukarnds view, the two
9' Sukarno, An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams (New York: Bobbs-Merrill
(ompany,lg6S),61-63·
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opposing blocs of the Cold War were pursuing their own interests at the
expense of other countries. Sukarno fostered friendly relations with both
the US and the Soviet Union and its allies, including China, as he aspired to
unity on the international level.
SUKARNO AND US RELATIONS
Failing to understand the Javanese background and the complexity of
Sukarnds worldviews, many American policymakers viewed Sukarno
merely as a left-leaning, anti-US demagogue, who wanted to turn his nation
into a communist state.
When Sukarno intended to build close relations with the US, for
instance, President Eisenhower and his foreign policy makers had a
lukewarm response. The president himself appeared to be ambivalent. On
one hand, he publicly welcomed Sukarno to the US on a state visit in 1956,
but on the other hand he gave the Indonesian president the cold shoulder.10
In his autobiography Sukarno remembered that his conversation with
Eisenhower during the visit was "going nowhere" and that the American
president refused to talk to him about important matters. Eisenhower,
instead, only wanted to talk about films. Recalling the visit Sukarno noted:
t'At the White House he could manage only to discuss our mutual love for
motion pictures." II And when Sukarno tried to explain that' Asia was in
the stage of euphoria from recently-gained independence and that the US
should not interfere with Asian affairs, Eisenhower hardly reacted.
When in 1960 Sukarno visited the White House again, Eisenhower
insulted Sukarno by keeping him in an anteroom for a period oftime without
any formal explanation or apology." Sukarno saw that Eisenhower was
unwilling to take him seriously, let alone to view him as an equal. Indeed,
Eisenhower refused to understand or even show interest in Sukarno's views
regarding international relations. On the contrary, in 1956 the Eisenhower
administration began to fully support a major CIA clandestine operation
10 The American public was also enthusiastic about the visit. When Sukarno gave a
speech to US Congress, congressmen reacted to the speech with a standing ovation.
11 Sukarno, An Autobiography, 277.
12 Sukarno said, "I waited and waited. Finally, when it was close to an hour,l spoke
sharply to the Chief of Protocol, 'Have I to wait any longer? Because if so, I am leaving
right now.' The man went pale. 'Please, I beg of you... wait just a minute, Sir,' he
stammered and raced inside. Out came Eisenhower. He had no excuse. He didn't
even bother to offer one when I ultimately was ushered in." lbid., 295.
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for supporting a rebellion against Sukarno and his government. The
administration considered Sukarno pro-communist, and therefore an
obstacle to US interests in Indonesia.
Unlike President Eisenhower, President Kennedy appeared to
understand Sukarno. Kennedy had met Sukarno when he came to Indonesia
as a visiting congressman from Massachusetts in 1957.13 The visit had
helped Kennedy understand Indonesia in general as well as Sukarno's views
on domestic politics and foreign relations. On that basis Kennedy tried to
build a relationship with Sukarno different from that of his predecessor.v
In response, Sukarno felt that Kennedy respected him and his political
views." Once he said to Kennedy, "After all, what is international relations
but human relations on a larger scale?":"
In the context ofthe Cold War, Kennedy's cordial relations with Sukarno
were strategic in wooing Sukarno away from the Soviet bloc. But it was not
Kennedy's policy to unseat Sukarno from power or to support a rebellion
against him. On the contrary, Kennedy wanted to check the spread of
communism in Indonesia by winning Sukarno's heart and the hearts of the
Indonesian people. In other words, he wanted to minimize the influence of
communism in Indonesia by understanding Sukarno's political views and
standing.
With the demise of Kennedy and his administration in 1963,however, US
attitudes toward Indonesia changed. Washington returned to the unfriendly
approach ofthe Eisenhower administration-ifnot worse. President Lyndon
B. Johnson, Kennedy's successor, paid less and less attention to Indonesia,
while his foreign policy makers became increasingly hostile toward the
Indonesian president.
The beginning of President [ohnson's administration coincided with
the increasingly close relations between Sukarno and the Indonesian
13 John F. Kennedy, Personal Papers, Boston Office 194°-1956; Political Miscellany,
1945-56; Asia Trip, 1951; John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. See also
Baskara T. Wardaya, Cold War Shadow: United States Foreign Policy Toward Indonesia,
1953-1963. (Yogyakarta: PUSdEPand Galangpress, 20 ° 7), 294-295.
14 John F. Kennedy, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security files, John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
15Sukarno, An Autobiography, 7. Sukarno also remarked on Kennedy, "Here was a man
with a progressive mind. When Idiscussed my aid problems with him, he understood.
He agreed. Perhaps if Mr. Kennedywere still here our countries might not have drifted
SQ far apart." lbid., 296.
16 lbid., 7.
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Communist Party (PKI). For Sukarno, building closer relations with the PKI
(while controlling it) was important to maintaining In the
minds ofthe Johnson administration's foreign policy makers, such
an idea was merely a disguised move by Sukarno to push Indonesia into
becoming a communist country. And if Indonesia became a communist
country, they feared, it would become a serious threat to US interests in
Indonesia and in Southeast Asia in as indicated
in Vietnam.
Soon these policymakers began to seek ways to pressure Sukarno, or
even to rid him from Indonesia's political arena. One of the steps took
was to replace US Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones-who respected
Sukarno's views and personally got along well with him-with Marshall
Green, a staunch anti-communist diplomat. As soon as Green began his
task as the new US ambassador to Indonesia, he replaced Jones's policy of
"getting along" with a policy of "collision course" between Indonesia and the
US.
REMOVING SUKARNO FROM POWER
The golden opportunity to bring that "collision course" into full swing came
when, in the early hours of I October 1965, six high-ranking Indonesian
military generals were kidnapped and killed in the Indonesian capital of
Jakarta. Before the real culprits behind the kidnapping and killings were
found, General Suharto-head of the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve
Command and an anti-communist-declared the Indonesian Communist
Party leaders to be the masterminds of the killings. He and his supporters
also implied that Sukarno had quietly supported the murders.
Three weeks after the killing ofthe generals, violence erupted in Central
Java, East Java, Bali, and to a lesser degree, in several other parts ofIndonesia.
Many accused ofcommunism were massacred.'? In many cases these people
were rounded up, summarily shot, and buried in shallow graves or thrown
into the river. In total, between half a million and a million Indonesians
were killed during the three-month-long purge. Thousands of people were
taken into different prisons located throughout the country, and many of
them were later sent to the notorious island-prison of Buru, located in a
remote part of the country. They were killed and imprisoned without any
legal procedure whatsoever. Many more victims were to be stigmatized and
17 See Baskara T. Wardaya. Bung Karno Menggugat: Dari Marhaen, CIA, Pembantoian
Massal hingga G30S, i h edition (Yogyakarta: Galangpress, 2009).
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marginalized in Indonesian society long after the 1965 events.
While the killings were taking place, the US embassy in Jakarta reportedly
provided a list of 5,000 names of individuals who should be killed." The
purpose of the mass killing, as later studies suggested, was not only to
eliminate the communists in Indonesia, but also to deprive Sukarno of his
nationwide grassroots support and his legitimacy as Indonesia's president.
Many US foreign policy makers expected that by depriving Sukarno of his
support and legitimacy, they would weaken his hold of the presidency.'?
In the wake of the 1965 mass killings and imprisonment, Sukarno indeed
was replaced by General Suharto, who was friendlier toward the US and its
interests.
LEARNING THE LESSONS
US policymakers succeeded in helping anti-Sukarno groups in Indonesia
to remove the Indonesian president. The removal, however, was violent-
it cost innumerable human lives. From the Cold War perspective, the
violent removal was partly the result of fear among American foreign policy
makers-especially during the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations-
that left alone, Sukarno would turn Indonesia into a communist state,
thereby jeopardizing American interests. To some extent, this fear was the
product of the foreign policy makers' failure to understand and respect the
Indonesian president's personal and cultural background, particularly his
Javanese- Indonesian background.
The tragic events surrounding Sukarno's removal from the Indonesian
presidency were certainly too complex to be attributable solely to US
policymakers' failure to understand Sukarno's political attitudes and cultural
background. There were more pressing factors, such as Indonesia's domestic
power struggle and the ever-increasing east-west tension of the Cold War.
However, US foreign policy makers' misapprehension of Sukarno's politics
and culture aggravated their fear of Indonesia siding with the Soviets.
Byunderstanding Sukarno's concepts regarding politics, national unity,
and international relations in the context of Javanese culture and tradition,
US policymakers might have pursued peaceful ways of preventing Sukarno
and his nation from becoming antagonistic toward the US and its 'interests,
18 Edward C. Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1964-1968, Volume 26
(Washington: United States Government), 386-387.
19' See, for instance, Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of
Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs 58,2 (summer 1985): 239-64.
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saving the lives of so many Indonesians. The US's failure to such
understanding, we lately learn, unnecessarily to create a '1"'\/,\1 .. .,.. .. ,..."" 'I
situation that led to Indonesia's 1965 bloodbath.
US foreign policy towards Indonesia under Sukarno 1""\"YI"Y~T1/1aC' "l"Y"V"l'1"'\/'\ ...-+", ...,,+
lessons in foreign policy formulation. One lesson is the that the use of one-
sided and fear-driven views as the basis for formulating policies toward a
foreign country and its leader can bring tragic consequences to both the
country's leader and its people. The Cold War is over, but many foreign
policy makers-in the United States and in other countries-still tend to
view foreign leaders in simplistic terms, failing to understand them in the
context of their personalities and cultural backgrounds. As a result, many
foreign policy makers often see the removal of a national leader or military
engagement as the only solutions, though these solutions can cost countless
military and civilian lives. US military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq
since 2001 are just two examples.
There are lessons, too, for US-Indonesia relations in the age ofthe "War
on Terror," which both countries claim to be waging. Needless to say, in
international diplomacy, sensitivity to local traditions and culture remain
important. Perhaps the fact that President Barack Obama spent part of his
childhood in Indonesia helps US foreign policy makers better understand
Indonesia and prevents the use of violence in dealing with the country-its
leaders, and its people.
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